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NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
What’s the Point?
Edward A. Smith, Jr.
What is network-centric warfare? What’s the point? Many attempts to an-swer these questions emphasize the “network” and the new technologies
used to create more effective sensor and communications architectures. These
architectures, it is argued, will enable us to create and exploit a common situa-
tional awareness, increase our speed of command, and “get inside the enemy’s
OODA [observe, orient, decide, and act] loop.”1 Yet such descriptions of tech-
nologies and capabilities can leave us asking the same questions: What is it? Just
what does it bring to warfare? Why is it so critical to America’s future military
power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it?
These questions highlight the need for a warfare-centered working concept of
network-centric operations. Such conceptual work can help us both recognize
the potential in networking and discern its limits and limitations. It also can pro-
vide a fundamental understanding of the role of network-centric operations on the
battlefield and across the spectrum from peace through war. An evolving working
concept is, in short, the first step in designing a network-centric “navy after next.”
Using technology to multiply the impact of military
forces seems almost axiomatic. The problem is in identi-
fying which technological combinations hold the most
potential. Information technology is one obvious force
multiplier, but what we really face are three concurrent
technological revolutions.2
The first is in sensor technology. The sensor revolution
is twofold: one movement toward sensors able to achieve
near-real-time surveillance over vast areas, and another
toward smaller, cheaper, more numerous sensors that
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can be netted to detect, locate, identify, and track targets. Together, these trends
can produce systems that will provide the quantity and quality of data needed
to create a “situational awareness” that is “global in scope and precise in detail.”3
The second revolution is in information technology. The information revolution
will bring the geometric increase in computing power necessary to process, col-
late, and analyze this vast quantity of sensor data, and it will provide means to
distribute information to any recipient or “shooter” anywhere in the world at
near-real-time speeds. The third is in weapons technology. The weapons revolu-
tion is a matter of increasing numbers of precise munitions by reducing costs. It,
like the sensor revolution, is twofold. Better streams of targeting data can permit
a “dumbing down” of expensive guidance packages, while new designs, electron-
ics, “lean” manufacturing, and mass production can decrease the cost for a given
level of accuracy and capability.4
In the coming decade, these revolutions will interact and multiply each other’s
impacts and create a kaleidoscope of potential synergies that will change the char-
acter of war as we know it.5 These revolutions and this change in how we think
about war have come to be embodied in the idea of network-centric operations.
NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS
The first step in creating a working concept for network-centric operations is
identifying the key changes that grow from the triple technological revolution.
One change, clearly, is the increased precision and speed that may now be possi-
ble in military operations. Speed and precision make it feasible to exploit spe-
cific battlefield opportunities and operate at a pace calculated to overwhelm an
enemy’s capacity to respond. They also offer a highly agile force, able to change
from one rapid, precise operation to another at will and able to compress com-
plex targeting processes to fit the nearly real-time dimensions of the battlefield.
These emerging possibilities signal changes in how we wage war.
The leading network-centric proponents explain the impact of net-
work-centric warfare in this manner. In traditional military operations, a mis-
sion is assigned and planned, forces are generated, and operations are executed
to concentrate power on an objective. This is a highly coordinated, “stepped” cy-
cle: periods of relative inaction, during which forces are generated and actions
coordinated (the flat part of the step) alternate with periods of action, when
combat power is applied (the vertical part). However, if forces were networked
to create near-real-time situational awareness (see figure 1), we could act con-
tinuously. We would no longer need to pause before deciding on further ac-
tion; the information and coordination needed would already be there.
Moreover, shared awareness would permit a flattened, decentralized command
structure, with decisions made at the lowest practical level of command—a
6 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/5
“self-synchronization” that
would permit us to reclaim
“lost combat power.” Then,
as we train and organize to
optimize these capabilities,
the pace of these semi-inde-
pendent operations would
accelerate further to permit
a new “speed of command.”
This description makes clear
that network- centric opera-
tions are really about opti-
mizing combat power—that
is, combat efficiency.
While equating accelerated,
self-synchronized opera-
tions to increased combat
efficiency makes intuitive sense, it needs further explanation. One approach is to
look at the above-mentioned “steps” in the context of the well known work of
Colonel John Boyd, U.S. Air Force, but treating OODA loops as a succession of
linear cycles overlaid on the steps.6 Boyd’s “observe,” “orient,” and “decide”
phases then would equate to the flat part of a step, while the “act” phase would be
the vertical. Plotted on axes of time (x) versus cumulative application of military
force (y), the steps become OODA cycles, with each “act” adding to the total of
the military force applied (see figure 2).
This construct of a combat cycle brings us to look not just at decision making
but also at the parallel process of generating combat power. For example, the
“observe” process includes both the decision to observe certain activities and
the physical actions needed to acquire the intelligence, surveillance, and target-
ing data and then transmit it to the right people or systems. New sensor and
information technologies can compress this process significantly, but there is a
limit to how much. To optimize the impact of precision, we need more than
sensor-based awareness; we need to identify specific vulnerabilities, and to do
that we need to know the enemy. Such knowledge draws on sensor informa-
tion—and will be subject to some time compression as a result—but it also de-
pends on regional expertise and on intelligence databases developed long be-
fore the battle begins. Thus, the new sensors and information technology can
shorten the cycle only to the degree that long-term collection and analysis are al-
ready available on the net.
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A similar limit emerges in
the combined “orient and de-
cide” phase.7 Better awareness
helps us avoid mistakes and use
assets more efficiently, but we
must still complete a set of phys-
ical actions to generate military
power. We may have to move an
aircraft carrier into range of the
objective, plan and brief a mis-
sion, fuel and arm aircraft,
and launch them. We may also
have to deliver follow-on air
strikes to achieve an objective.
The pace of these actions is de-
termined by the physical capa-
bilities of systems and people; a
carrier can move only so fast, and flight deck operations can be hurried along
only so much. “Efficiency” here is as much a function of how we organize, train,
and equip our forces as it is of information flows. The same is true of the “act”
phase. Once in the air, aircraft must proceed toward the target and then—at a
time dependent on the speed and range of the weapons used and the distance
they must travel—launch their ordnance.
To increase combat efficiency, therefore, we must accelerate both parts of the
combat cycle, the OODA cycle and the process of generating combat power. A
strike-sortie-generation demonstration conducted by USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in
1997 is a good example of how these two elements come together.8 Nimitz used
only a rudimentary network to aid targeting and decision making, but it then
focused on optimizing the operations of the carrier and the air wing to make
better use of the increased information that the network made available. For this
demonstration, among other things, Nimitz added pilots to its air wing, intro-
duced new high-speed cyclical operations, and relied on accompanying missile
ships for air defense.9 The result was a fourfold increase in sorties over a
four-day period. Arming each aircraft with multiple precision weapons, each of
which could reliably destroy an aim point, further multiplied the effect. The bat-
tle group thus established a faster, more efficient power-generation cycle, one
that produced—when combined with networks’ ability to identify the “targets
that count” in commensurate numbers—an order-of-magnitude increase in the
group’s combat efficiency.
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This is significant for several reasons. First, the Nimitz operation shows that
using better equipment, organization, training, and information can shorten
power-generation cycles and thus take advantage of network-centric speed and
awareness. However, it also indicates that the time required for power genera-
tion varies with equipment, training, and organization; that in turn suggests
that dissimilar military forces have power-generation cycles of radically differ-
ent lengths. For example, the length of Nimitz’s cycle would differ from that of a
squad of SEALs (Navy special operations forces) inserted from a submarine, a
cruiser firing Tomahawk land-attack missiles, a squad of Marines in a firefight,
or bombers operating from bases in the continental United States.
In a traditional battle, the commander manages the complex interaction
among different combat cycles by so coordinating units that their respective
“act” phases strike the enemy at the same time or in some prescribed sequence.
The more diverse the forces, the greater the coordination problem.10 The entire
effort is held hostage to the speed of the slowest combat cycle, all other units be-
ing deliberately kept from achieving their optimum operational tempos so as to
mass effects or be mutually supportive. This forgoes additional cycles that might
have been applied by quicker-paced forces, and as a result, less power is applied
overall (see figure 3). In short, by optimizing mass, we minimize efficiency.
Here is where agility becomes important. Precision and speed permit us
to reduce cycle length and thereby increase the pace of operations, but they are
insufficient by themselves to create a warfare revolution—or prevent it from
backfiring. To deal with changes in the enemy threat or take advantage of
emerging battlefield opportunities, we must be able both to conduct rapid,
semi-independent operations
and to mass forces and ef-
fects as required. We must
be able to change the mode,
direction, and objectives of
our actions, just as much as
we need to bring speed and
precision to targeting.
This agility and the speed
and precision it exploits all
derive from the amalgam of
information, sensors, and com-
munications that constitutes
the “information backplane”
of network-centric operations.
The network permits us to
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undertake more actions in a given time, to focus those actions better, and to act
and react faster and with more certainty. Yet, these attributes—better, faster,
more—still add up to little more than a more efficient form of attrition. How do
we make the leap to a level of efficiency that would permit us to break enemies’
wills rather than simply grind down their means of waging war?
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS
While increasing the number of aim points struck, the volume of fire generated,
or the damage inflicted remains a critical, irreducible core of what military
forces do, it is only the first step toward combat efficiency. The real payoff in
network-centric operations is foreshortening combat by causing the enemy to
yield long before his means to resist have been exhausted, or long before addi-
tional friendly forces might be expected to arrive in the crisis area. This effi-
ciency revolves around the ability of network-centric forces to undertake precise
effects-based operations, that is, outcome-oriented activity focused on enemy be-
havior. The objective of these operations is psychological rather than physical.
Hence, they are focused on the enemy’s decision-making process and ability to
take action in some coherent manner—especially “getting inside his OODA
loop” and inducing or exploiting chaos. The knowledge, precision, speed, and
agility brought by network-centric operations constitute the price of admission
into this realm.
“Getting Inside OODA Loops”
In our OODA-cycle diagram, any “act” or application of combat power can be
seen in two ways. From the perspective of straightforward attrition, it is an effort
that attacks, destroys, or in some way degrades the enemy capability to wage war
or sustain it. Yet, that same “act” is also a stimulus that enemies “observe” and
factor into their decision-making processes. The more significant the action, the
greater effect it will have on decisions. This “effect” is a function not solely of
how much we destroy but of what and how we attack. If the stimulus is signifi-
cant enough, the effect may be to force enemies to reconsider their courses of ac-
tion and, perhaps, begin their decision-making cycles all over again. That is to
say, we would disrupt their OODA loops. A succession of such stimuli might not
only disrupt a foe’s OODA loop but even create a condition of “lockout,” in
which the enemy can no longer react coherently (see figure 4).
The requirements for such effects-based operations are stringent. If we were
concerned only with attrition, improvement in efficiency would require only in-
creases in the size and frequency of our attacks—that is, the total quantity of
power applied. Breaking the will, in contrast, requires putting the right forces on
the right vulnerabilities at the right times so as to produce some particular effect.
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To make matters more diffi-
cult, this needs to be done
not just to a single enemy
OODA cycle, as in a one-on-
one fighter engagement, but
against the multiple and in-
teracting OODA cycles of
different enemy units and
forces, which are operating
simultaneously at the tactical,
operational, and strategic lev-
els of conflict.
A pointed, if serendipitous,
example of such a disruption
occurred in the battle of
Midway in June 1942. Intel-
ligence derived from the
breaking of Japanese codes enabled the Americans to anticipate the Japanese
attack, detect enemy carriers before their own were found, and launch an attack
first. When the Japanese commander received word of an American carrier in
the area—just before he was attacked by carrier-based torpedo planes—he
reconsidered a planned attack on Midway, reoriented his effort, and ordered
his aircraft rearmed for fleet action. Then, as his planes were being rearmed
and his combat air patrol aircraft were engaged in low-level intercepts of
American torpedo planes,
the dive-bomber element of
the disjointed American attack
(in figure 5, the second dot-
ted arrow) struck, catching
the Japanese carriers with
their decks full of planes and
bombs.11 What happened in
the next minutes ended the
Japanese attack on Midway
and was the turning point
in the Pacific War. In effect,
the sighting of one ship and
a tactically ineffective tor-
pedo-plane attack had collec-
tively, and fortuitously, a
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decisive impact on the enemy OODA cycle: they occurred at just the right time
and forced the Japanese to begin anew. The challenge for network-centric opera-
tions is to repeat this effect reliably, predictably, and at will. How do we do that?
If we compare the Japanese and American combat cycles at the time of the
torpedo attack, it becomes evident that the cycles were out of phase with each
other. Had they been in phase, American and Japanese strikes would have
passed each other in the air and struck empty decks on both sides, without the
disastrous consequences for the Japanese—but possibly dire ones for the
smaller force of American carriers. But thanks to its intelligence coup, the
American side completed its observation, orientation, and decision phases in
time for its air-strike “act” to hit the Japanese when they were most vulnerable
and before they could initiate a fleet action. The American success rested partly
on careful preparation—the intelligence, reconnaissance, and early launch of
aircraft—and in part on the serendipity of the poorly (in terms of the plan) co-
ordinated arrival of their strike elements over the target.
To emulate Midway, we must measure the enemy OODA cycle correctly and
then coordinate our actions to occur at exactly the right times. This requires
not only the “battlespace awareness” that in 1942 enabled the American fleet to
launch its strikes first but also knowledge of the enemy necessary to identify
and exploit critical junctures.12 We must then be able to sustain controlled,
high-tempo operations. There is a problem here: intelligence simply will not yield
such knowledge of the enemy reliably, consistently, or at all levels.13 How then
might network-centric operations enable us to bring about another Midway?
One solution is to multiply
the number of opportunities
to repeat the Midway seren-
dipity. The more frequent the
stimulus, the greater the chance
a strike will occur at the right
time to obtain the desired effect
on the enemy decision-making
process. Shortening the length
of our overall combat cycle (see
figure 6) would multiply the
number of impacts on an ad-
versary’s decision making over
a given period and increase the
likelihood of striking at the
“right time” to disrupt the
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adversary’s cycle. But as we have noted, the power-generation side of the combat cy-
cle can be compressed only so much.
Another approach would be to build on “self-synchronization” and “shared
situational awareness” to launch smaller, more numerous operations, each of
which could generate a stimulus sufficient to affect the adversary’s OODA cy-
cles.14 The length of the individual unit combat cycles might remain the same,
but they could be staggered, overlapped, so as to produce a rapid succession of
stimuli. This approach has an obvious limitation: the more we diminish the size
of our individual actions, the more vulnerable each will be to defeat in detail.
However, with better awareness and better knowledge of the enemy, we can hope
to anticipate enemy actions and optimize forces for disruptive effect or for
mutual support (see figure 7).
Finally, we could multiply the number of cycles but also compress the time
needed to execute each cycle. In essence, we would use our network-centric
capability to liberate individual forces to operate at their respective optimum
combat cycles and by so do-
ing increase the number of
OODA cycles we execute.
Ideally, the stimuli can be
made numerous enough to
overwhelm enemies with new
developments, forcing them
continually to revisit deci-
sions, redirect efforts, and
pause for observations, even
to the point that they cannot
ever take action.
This suggests an analogy
very different from that of
Midway. Instead of thrusting
a rapier into the OODA cycle
at precisely the critical time,
we could unleash something akin to a swarm of bees. Even if no single unit has a
decisive impact, the overall effect might be to leave the victim swinging help-
lessly at attackers coming from all directions, unable to mount any coherent de-
fense save retreat. In essence, we would provide so many stimuli that adversaries
could no longer act coherently but must constantly recycle: “Does the act that
just struck me invalidate the assumptions upon which my currently intended
course of action rests? Does it demand a redirection of my effort? Will an
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additional attack come, and will it force me into revisiting my plans yet again?”
The result would be lockout.
This “swarm”approach poses new challenges. How do we coordinate the swarm
so as to achieve concrete military objectives beyond simply interfering—
perhaps without success—in the enemy decision-making loop? How do we
know when to mass forces or effects so as to avoid their being destroyed one by
one? How do we assess the effectiveness of our efforts and then feed the results of
these assessments into the next round of “orient,” “decide,” and “act” phases?
Will enemies know they have been defeated and cease to resist, or simply con-
tinue to swat at the attacks until they can no longer do so—that is, continue a
blind attrition war? To be effective, the “swarm” would need to work toward a
unified set of military objectives, under a single commander’s intent, whereas to
achieve sufficiently brief cycle times, its individual elements must be largely
self-contained and self-coordinated. In short, our forces would need to become
self-synchronized and self-adaptive—but those are key capacities we hope to
draw from network-centric operations.
Exploiting Chaos
The principle of chaos in warfare is not new.15 Clausewitz talks in terms of ex-
ploiting the fog and friction of war to drive the enemy into a rout—that is, into a
state of chaos.16 Recent writings on “chaos theory” have drawn a comparison be-
tween the concept of chaos in physical systems and its application to warfare.17
The boundary region between chaos and order is particularly significant, be-
cause small inputs or changes in system parameters there can have very large im-
pacts, even causing entire systems to collapse. In military operations, this would
equate to creating situations in which relatively small applications of power at
the right time have highly disproportionate and potentially decisive impacts.
This is particularly significant for expeditionary warfare and forward presence,
in that it suggests that a relatively small forward force might exploit chaos to off-
set what it lacks in numbers.
How do we define this boundary region in militarily useful ways? A simple ap-
proach is to define the edge of chaos in terms of the intensity of the operations,
specifically the pace and the scale and scope of operations, which can be plotted
along the x and y axes of a coordinate scale. We can understand intuitively that the
more we increase the pace of our operations (x), the more difficult they will be to
manage. Similarly, the greater the scope and scale of our operations (y), the more
difficult they will be to control. By extension, we can surmise that at some point
along the x axis lies an operation so rapid that we cannot coordinate it, and that
somewhere on the y axis is an operation (such as a global thermonuclear war) of
such size or scope that we lose control of our forces; beyond either of these points
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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we lapse into chaos ourselves
(see figure 8). These two
points represent transitions
from order into chaos. Figu-
ratively, then, a line drawn
between these two points is
the edge of chaos—it defines
the limit of our control, and
it contains all order-to-chaos
transition points.
In this context, chaos en-
compasses all military op-
erations that are so rapid or
of such scale as to be un-
controllable and that are,
therefore, unfocused and
incoherent, such as a rout on
a battlefield—“every man for himself.”18 The opposite is order—military oper-
ations whose scale, scope, and pace permit them to be controlled, coordinated,
and focused on given objectives. Historically, when armies and navies have met
in battle, at least one tactical objective has been to drive the enemy force from or-
der into chaos. How can we identify and exploit this operational boundary?
One factor is that the edge of chaos is not fixed. It changes constantly. As the
Nimitz demonstration underlined, a highly trained and organized force using
sophisticated equipment can operate safely at a pace and scale of operations that
would push a less well-trained and equipped force into chaos. Better equipment,
training, and organization, then, enable us to drive our transition points farther
out along the x and y axes and thereby define new edges of chaos. This also
means that the edge of chaos varies from one force to the next, as each comprises
different units, differently equipped, manned, trained, and organized. Opposing
forces in any battle are therefore likely to have their own, quite different, edges of
chaos. These two edges of chaos define three zones. Zone 1 (see figure 9) is the
zone of chaos—all the combinations of scale, scope, and pace that neither side
would be able to manage. Zone 2 defines a complex, asymmetric region in which
the better equipped and trained force can coordinate operations but the other
cannot. In Zone 3 is the realm in which both sides can operate comfortably—the
zone of order.
By definition, neither side can operate successfully in Zone 1, and neither
derives any advantage from operating in a way that permits its enemy an orderly
and focused response (Zone 3).19 In contrast, the boundary region, Zone 2, offers
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the disproportionate impacts
predicted by chaos theory. It is
a regime of inherent asymme-
try, in which the less capable
side can neither respond in
kind nor fail to respond (and
be pummeled into submission
or confined to preplanned ac-
tions, unresponsive to the situ-
ation).20 This can be carried
another step. If one side is con-
sistently able to operate beyond
the other’s edge of chaos, it can
induce a state of despair in
which further resistance is, or
at least appears to be, futile.
Focusing precisely on vulnerabilities most likely to drive the enemy into chaos can
accelerate this process.
SELF-SYNCHRONIZATION AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
This all leads us to self-synchronized operations, of which a good historical ex-
ample is the 1805 battle of Trafalgar, in which Admiral Horatio Nelson de-
stroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets. The crux of the action was
Nelson’s bold movement to break through the French-Spanish battle line in two
places and then concentrate his forces on bite-sized portions of it. The basis for
success in so risky an undertaking was what could be described as a “cerebral
network” among Nelson and his ship captains, his “band of brothers.” That net-
work had been formed by more than eight years of combat operations together;
Nelson was confident that all of his subordinates would perceive a developing
situation in the same way—that is, that they would have a shared situational
awareness.21 He was equally sure that his commanders not only understood his
intent but would exploit aggressively any opening in the enemy line accordingly
and carry out mutually supportive actions without further direction. For that
reason, Nelson could limit his final directive before the battle to the inspiring,
but otherwise not very helpful, reminder that “England expects every man to do
his duty.” Nothing more was needed. The commanders knew what to do.
This contrasted sharply with the situation of the opposing commander, Ad-
miral Villeneuve. His force was larger and in many ways technologically supe-
rior, but it lacked any semblance of the cerebral networking Nelson had forged.
The French ship captains and subordinate commanders had spent most of the
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war blockaded in port. They distrusted Villeneuve, even as Villeneuve distrusted
his own judgment. Added to this was the problem of coordinating with a Span-
ish fleet, with which the French had never before operated. The best Villeneuve
could do was to form his ships into a conventional eighteenth-century line of
battle, foreseeing an engagement in which two ordered, parallel battle lines
would pound each other until most of the ships of one side or the other struck
their colors, blew up, or sank. When Nelson refused battle on these terms and in-
stead broke through the French-Spanish line, the pace of operation that he
thereby forced on the French and Spanish immediately exceeded their ability to
cope and invalidated their numerical superiority. Villeneuve largely lost control
of his forces and with it the ability to fight a coherent battle. In such conditions
his ships, though they fought bravely, could only contribute to the general chaos;
a substantial proportion never entered the battle at all.
Network-centric operations can, after a fashion, replicate the cerebral network-
ing of Nelson’s band of brothers without the eight years of combat preparation and
without the slow tempo of battle at sea that facilitated situational awareness in the
early nineteenth century. However, there is a hitch: What would happen if one side’s
edge of chaos did not lie entirely on one side of the other’s but crossed it (figure 10),
producing a second asymmetric zone, in which the advantages were reversed?
This reversal points to a dangerously misleading assumption underlying much
thinking today about the “revolution of military affairs”: that the United States
will always be technologically superior and thus fight faster and better. In reality,
tempo of operations is not solely a function of technology; it is also a func-
tion of the centralization of command. One can choose to trade centralized
control for speed and scope of operations. This may forgo some of the ability to
mass effects on a specific ob-
jective, but if the effect sought
derives from the pace and
scope of the attacks rather
than from the amount of de-
struction, or from a cumula-
tive impact rather than specific
actions, then this trade-off
may be acceptable. In other
words, one could confront a
technologically superior en-
emy by creating a new asym-
metric zone in which small,
decentralized units could
operate successfully but in
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which an opponent using large formations under centralized control could
not respond coherently.
The importance of this fourth zone is even more evident if we plot the re-
spective edges of chaos on a graph with three axes (figure 11)—one for pace, one
for scale, and a separate orthogonal axis for scope. This presentation high-
lights two aspects of decentralization: forces can be broken into smaller,
self-synchronized units, and they can be dispersed over a wide area to make co-
ordinated and timely response
by the other side more difficult.
These points correspond rather
closely to Maoist theory of
guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas use
dispersed formations so small
that they cannot be targeted ef-
fectively by heavier government
forces. These bands then con-
duct many small raids, so rap-
idly that the raiders are gone
before opposing forces can be
brought to bear. Since the de-
sired effect, attrition of an op-
ponent’s will, depends more on
pace and scope than on damage
to specific targets, control can
remain highly decentralized. This was the essential problem the United States
confronted in Vietnam.
These examples imply a new understanding of chaos—that chaos need not
mean solely loss of control over one’s forces. It could also mean a situation
in which the size of forces and delays in generating and using them consis-
tently prevent one side from accomplishing its objectives. How do net-
work-centric operations address this low-tech asymmetry? One way is based on
the knowledge and situational awareness brought to bear by the network. If the
guerrillas’ actions can be anticipated or instantly detected and responded to,
much of what they gain by dispersing and decentralizing can be negated. In ef-
fect, networking permits the high-tech side to move its edge of chaos out from
the x and z axes of the diagram until decentralization no longer confers any ad-
vantage on the guerrillas. Also, whereas by decentralization guerrillas or urban
fighters opt for increasing the number and decreasing the size of their opera-
tions, a network-centric force might do the same—for example, by resorting to a
ground war of small units aided by superior situational awareness. Alternatively,
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it could increase its pace, using the network to manage high-speed, complex op-
erations. In each case, networking combined with self-synchronization enables
forces to operate as a “self-adjusting complex adaptive system” while retaining
the ability to mass superior effects at will.
A REALITY CHECK
As we gradually build a working concept of network-centric operations, we need
to bear in mind some commonsense caveats. Networking is not a universal solu-
tion to warfare problems, nor will it change the nature of war. Older forms of
warfare are likely to persist alongside the new. Speed will be critical to our suc-
cess, but numbers and endurance will still count. Situational awareness will
multiply our power, but knowing the enemy will be more important than ever.
Above all, intelligent adversaries will respond, and the more successful our
concept of network-centric operations becomes, the more asymmetrical their
responses are likely to be.
But it is not our objective in developing a working concept to provide all the
answers. It is simply to identify combinations of new thinking and new things
that offer better answers to our warfare needs, on as many levels of war as pos-
sible, and over as wide a portion of the spectrum of conflict as possible. The
measure of our success will be not the quality of the networking or the quantity
of firepower we can bring to bear but the effect that networking enables us to
have on our would-be enemies in peace and in war.
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